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Abstract
This paper deals with an issue of increasing importanc e in a world where preferenti al
trading arrangeme nts are the call of the day: the effects on world welfare of sequential customs union formation . A computati onal model of customs union formation is developed and
simulated under a variety of assumptio ns. These assumptio ns concern various characteri stics
of the world, the pattern of customs union formation , and GATT restriction s on the common
external tariff imposed by the customs union. The results show that unrestrict ed customs
union formation is likely to result in successive deteriorat ion of world welfare, despite gains
for the member countries collectively. An examinati on of the current GATT guidelines, however, reveals that if they were more vigorously enforced, the deleteriou s effects of customs
union formation could be eliminated .
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1. Introduction

The existence of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been
largely responsible for the historical reductions in the incidence of tariffs worldwide. The
current Uruguay Round of negotiations is, however, calling into question the ability of the
GATT to continue as the primary forum for trade negotiations. There are in fact those
in the economics profession who suggest that the GATT as an institution is either dead,
should be shot, or both. Concurrent with the declining success of the multilateral negotiations is an increased willingness of countries to enter into preferential trading arrangements
(PTAs ). Examples of such arrangements are the European Economic Community (EEC),
the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). While it is not clear that the GATT is being appropriately eulogized, it
is increasingly clear that a greater understanding of the effects on world welfare of PTAs is
needed. Accordingly, this paper proceeds to analyze the welfare effects of a particular type
of PTA: the fo~mation of a customs union.
Of particular interest is the path of global welfare in a world in which trade liberalization is accomplished solely through customs union formation. While conventional wisdom
has it that sequential rounds of multilateral negotiations will inch us ever closer to the optimal pattern of world trade, the same cannot be said, with any confidence, of sequential
customs union formation. Inherent in the formation of any given customs union are competing forces on welfare; there is a welfare-improving tendency for trade between member
countries to increase and a welfare-reducing tendency to discourage trade between the memher countries and the rest of the world. While it is unlikely that completely general results
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regarding the path of world welfare will ever exist, it is important that we develop some
intuition into the likely path of world welfare. It is this intuition that will guide policy and
attitudes regarding the restriction or regulation of preferential trading arrangements. Such
restrictions might come from within the confines of the GATT which has as its primary goal
the promotion of the optimal pattern of world trade. The extent, then, to which unfettered
customs union formation is consistent with this goal should be reflected in GATT policy.
The existing theoretical literature on customs union formation, of which there is a
great deal, has devoted substantial effort towards decomposing and quantifying the impact
on welfare of a given customs union. The work largely begins with the pioneering effort of
Jacob Viner (1950), which introduced the distinction between the trade creating and trade
diverting effects of a given customs union mentioned above. A recent review and extension
of the literature is to be found in de Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik (1992).
What is noteworthy, however, is that the literature referred to above deals only with
the formation of a single customs union. What we actually observe is a dynamic process
of more and larger unions being formed. Therefore, the question that appears especially
relevant is: Will successive customs union formation lead to increased world welfare? Ultimately, the answer must be yes, if the process leads to its logical culmination in a world
consisting of one customs union - a situation of global free trade. Whether or not world
welfare increas~ in the intermediate stages is unclear, but important given the likely event
that the process will stop short of free trade.
Krugman (1991) and Deardorff and Stern (1991) represent two recent attempts to
identify the effects of dynamic customs union formation. Each provides insight into the
path of world welfare under a regime of bilateral trade negotiations by employing very
different methodologies. Deardorff and Stern, using a model in which trade conforms to the
patterns dictated by comparative advantage, theoretically derive the path of world welfare
as the world, through symmetric customs union formation, moves from autarky to free trade.
Tariffs are set at a level that prohibits inter-bloc trade while intra-bloc trade is undistorted.
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Individual countries differ in terms of technology and endowments. They proceed to derive
the expected level of world welfare at each stage. The resulting path of world welfare is
a concave function that increases monotonically as the world moves from autarky to free
trade. The basic conclusion is that the majority of the gains from trade could be captured
by a, small group of large trading blocs. "The blocs would only need to be large enough
and to include countries with a sufficiently divergent variety of comparative advantages."
(Deardorff and Stem, 1991, p. 26) As we will see, the inclusion of non-prohibitive tariffs,
and hence the possibility of trade diversion, in the analysis alters this result.
Alternatively, Krugman uses a highly stylized model of differentiated products in
1
which each country produces a single good that is distinguishable from all other goods.

Each stage of customs union formation assumes that every country enters into a trading
agreement with exactly one country, or pre-existing bloc of countries, at each stage, resulting
in symmetrically sized trading blocs; which is similar to the format used by Deardorff and
Stem. He finds, in simulations, that world welfare declines with customs union formation
until the number of blocs reaches three. Beyond this point CU formation is found to be
welfare improving. 2
Krugman assumes optimal tariff formation, but as Deardorff and Stern point out,
his extreme form of product differentiation imposes something very like the Armington assumption; i.e.,: that goods are differentiated completely on the basis of country of origin.
The Armington assumption in this context exaggerates the role of trade diversion (the negative aspect of CU formation) relative to trade creation (the positive aspect). Since trade
diversion is most often thought to be welfare reducing, this assumption will produce results
for the path of world welfare that are excessively pessimistic.
The present paper sheds new light on the issue of successive customs unions formation. In particular, a computational model of dynamic customs union formation is developed
1 Conceptually, Krugman's model is identical to one in which each country is endowed with a unique commodity
and trading patterns conform to comparative advantage.
2 Tests perlormed with the model presented here reveal that it is the product differentiation assumption that is
directly responsible for the minimal level of welfare at 3 blocs rather than 2.

and used to gener ate the expec ted path of world welfare. The mode
l presen ted here is conceptu ally simila r to that of Deardorff and Stern , with the excep
tion that non-prohibitive
tariffs are assumed. As will become clear, this difference permi ts
the discussion of a much
broad er array of issues.

In brief, the model is based on a world of pure exchange with tradin
g patter ns
determ ined by comp arativ e advantage; goods flow from countries in
which they are relatively
abund ant into count ries in which they are relativ ely scarce. In the
bench mark case, countries
are assum ed to set tariffs optim ally at all stages. That is, each
bloc sets tariff rates to
maxim ize welfare taking the tariffs of the other blocs as given. 3 The
path of world welfare
is calcul ated as countries sequentially enter into custom s union agreem
ents; asymm etrica lly
sized custom s unions are possible.
More precisely, in each period of a seque ntial game, two countries,
or blocs of countries, are selected rando mly to elimin ate the barrie rs to trade betwe
en them and to impose
comm on extern al barrie rs on goods originating in other countries. 4
This process continues
until there is a single customs union counting all of the countries
in the world as members.
The focus of the analysis will be on the expec ted change in world
welfare corresponding to
changes in the numb er of tradin g blocs. It should be noted that
the struct ure imposed on
the mode l result s in an increase in welfare for the customs union
collectively, but that one
or more memb ers may experience a decline in welfare. That is, with
intra- union transfers,
all memb er countries can be made better off by enteri ng into the custom
s union.
As will be seen, customs union formation is likely to have deleterious
effects on world
welfare prior to reaching global free trade. The robus tness of this result
is tested in two ways;
first, by alterin g the distrib ution of goods across count ries, i.e., makin
g the distri bution more
I

3 This approa
ch is not a realistic represe ntation of the politics of trade policy.
As a single, clearly defined model
of the politica l economy of tariff formati on does not exist, this
form of externa l tariff formula tion provides
a useful starting point. The structu re of the model also limits
the types of regimes that can be examin ed.
For exampl e, the pure exchange nature eliminates the potenti al
for a pro-pro ducer or pro-<:onsumer bias in
determ ining trade policy.
4 As there is no
single explana tion, economic or political, for which countri es will
likely enter into a p~erential
trading arrange ments, the assump tion of random selection will serve
as a useful benchm ark. Simula tions based
on particu lar selectio n rules will also be present ed; e.g., rules based
on the relative endowm ent structu re of the
countri es.

or less equal; and second, by selectively choosing countries to form trading blocs, either the
two countries with the most similar pattern of endowments , or the countries with the most
different pattern of endowments . The results of these tests reveal that the magnitude of the
welfare effect is altered by altering the distribution of goods, but that the direction is not. A
more concentrated distribution of goods results in a more extreme decline in world welfare
with customs union formation. The results again hold when it is the most similar countries
forming a customs union, but when the most different countries are selected we find that
world welfare increases at every stage.
Subsequent attention is given to different forms of GATT involvement , or influence on
external tariffs, that might affect the path of world welfare with customs union formation.
As noted above, the benchmark simulations assume optimal tariffs. To emulate GATT
involvement , simulations are performed that assume countries entering into a customs union
are somewhat less aggressive. Three simulatiou; are performed assuming that countries set
the tariff on each good not higher than the maximum, a trade weighted average, or the
minimum of the pre-existing tariffs, respectively. The general result is that in each of these
cases world welfare is an increasing function of customs union formation.
Each of the scenarios outlined above provide additional evidence and insight into the
likely path of world welfare in a world where preferential trading arrangement s are a common
form of trade liberalization . It is in this way that this paper builds on and extends the meager
literature concerning the dynamic "time-path" of world

welfare~

The paper proceeds as

follows. Section 2 presents a model of customs union formation in a comparative advantage
framework, including a discussion of the assumptions and characteristi cs of the model that
particularly influence the results. Section 3 provides simulation results intended to facilitate
a discussion of the role played by various characteristi cs of the world in determining the
path of world welfare under a system of PTAs. These characteristi cs include the degree of
specializatio n of each country; the extent to which it is similar or different countries that
enter into trading arrangement s; and ways in which the GATT might influence the resulting

common external tariff levels so as to minimize welfare losses. Section 4 concludes and
provides a discussion of possible extensions.

2. The Theoretica l Model
The model employed is one of n countries and m commodities . Each country enters
the system as a representativ e consumer, assumed to maximize a utility function of the
following Cobb-Dougl as form:
m

Ui

=All Cij,

(1)

j=l

where i indexes country and j indexes goods, subject to the budget constraint
m

L
j=l

m

Pj(l

+ rj)Cij =

L
j=l

m

Pj(l

+ rj)fij + L

P;rjMij,

j=l

where: Cij is the consumption of good j in country i; fij is country i's endowment of good j;
Mij

is the net imports of good j by country i, (Ci;- fij ); Pj is the world price of good j; and

rj is the tariff imposed on good j in country i. The left hand side of the budget constraint is
the value of consumption and the right hand side is the value of the endowments including
tariff revenue, i.e., national income. It is assumed that each country retains and redistributes
the tariff revenue collected at its borders.
It is

as~umed

that there are equal amounts of each good in world supply. Each good

is distributed across the n countries via random draws from a normal distribution with a
common pre-specified variance. 5 Each country is, therefore, endowed with some of each good.
The endowments are normalized within each country so that the sum of endowments is the
same in each country. 6 Given the distribution of goods across countries, this ensures that the
countries are approximate ly the same size, both in terms of quantities and values, calculated
at the free trade prices. These assumptions are made to facilitate a greater understandin g
5 The distribution is given
a mean such that the lowest random draw is positive. This rules out negative endowments. While the normal distribution has infinite tails, a sample of random draws from a normal distribution
will, in general, have finite tails.
6 Units are chosen such that the free trade prices
are the same for each good. Equalizing quantities is therefore
equivalent to equalizing the wealth of each country.

7 . "' of the results by abstracting from changes in welfare due to transfers from large to small
countries and from the effects of relatively scarce goods. 7
Utility maximization leads to an expenditure system that allocates a fixed portion
of income to the consumption of each good. The derived demand for each good is

E '!"= 1 P; · €ii
Ci;

=

1

P·O··

(3)

'

1 '1

where
8ij =

f (1 ++ T~) ·
k=l

1

Tk

Note that the demand for each good is a function of the landed price of that good, P;(1 +r/).
World prices are determined by the requirement that global demand for each good be equal
to its fixed supply, i.e.,
n

L
i=l

n

Cij =

L

€ij,

j = 1, ... ,m.

(4)

i=l

Given the assumption that preferences in each country are identical, an appropriate index
of world welfare is obtained as the sum of each country's utility,

The results that follow focus on changes in WU corresponding to changes in the global
trading envirm;unent.

Nash Tariff Equilibrium
At each stage, it is assumed that each country or bloc of countries is pursuing a
policy of optimal tariffs, i.e., that the system is at the Nash tariff equilibrium. The Nash
tariff equilibrium is characterized by a matrix of tariffs such that each country, or bloc of
countries, is maximizing its welfare given the tariffs of the other countries. An algorithm for
obtaining the Nash equilibrium tariffs follows.
7 These are important issues that are beyond the scope of this paper; future work will address these issues.

Equa tion (3) defines consumption to be a func tion
of prices and own tariffs, Gij =
C(P, ~i); where Pis the vect or of world prices and Ti
is the vector of tariffs levied by coun try
i. Equ ation (4) then defines world prices impl icitly
as a func tion of global tariffs, P
P( T),
where r = ( r 1 , •.• , r"] .8 Solving (4) for P( r) and
subs titut ing back into (3) results in goods
dem and equa tions , C(r) , depending only on tarif f
levels. Furt her subs titut ion into the utili ty

=

function, equa tion (1 ), resu lts in an equa tion U( r)
that direc tly relat es each coun try's utili ty
to r, the matr ix of tariffs for each good in each coun
try.
From U(r) the opti mal or Nash equi libri um tarif
fs are derived as the r such that ,
given every othe r countries tariffs, no coun try can impr
ove its welfare by alter ing its tariffs, ri.
In principle, this equi libri um could be solved for as
the ri that solve the first orde r conditions
~U;_ = 0 for each country. In an effort to main tain
CJ1i1
the general natu re of the model, and for
com puta tiona l reasons, the solution is gene rated by
the use of itera tive num erica l techniques.
The proc edur e begins with good 1 in coun try 1. A
search is cond ucte d for the tarif f
on good 1 that maximizes welfare in coun try 1 subj
ect to all othe r tariffs in the world being
9
zero. The proc edur e continues thro ugh the rema
ining tariffs in coun try 1 and proceeds to
do the sam e for the tariffs in the othe r countries. At
the end of this roun d we have found the
optim al tariffs for each coun try in the absence of
retal iatio n. Subsequent rounds dete rmin e
the level of retal iatio n that is necessary to arriv e
at the Nash tarif f equilibrium.
The se<:ond roun d proceeds along the sam e lines as
the first, searching for the optim al
tariffs. This time , however, the tariffs are condition
al on the first roun d tariffs for all of the
othe r countries. This proc edur e is repe ated until no
coun try wishes to alter its tariffs. At this
poin t, the Nash tarif f equi libri um has been estab lishe
d and welfare calculations can proceed
as outli ned above. 10 It should be note d that it was
necessary to impo se the cons train t that
taxe s/sub sidie s on expo rts be zero for the syste m
to have a unique solution. 11
8 Endo
wmen ts are const ant and hence not included in the
argum ent string .
9

The first round search is condu cted in a range from
zero to ten; that is, ad valorem tariff rates in the
of zero to 1,000 perce nt. Subse quent round search
range
es are condu cted withi n an interv al of two surro
undin g the
previous round solution.
10 In only one
out of some ten thous and simulations did this proce
dure fail to converge to the equilibrium.
11 This framework furthe r excludes the analysis
of such impo rtant eleme nts in CU forma tion as increa
sing return s
to scale and changes in mark et struct ure that accom
pany the forma tion of tradin g blocs.

9 ....

Customs Union Formation

The next stage of the model involves successive customs umon ( CU) formation.
12 Once
First, two of the n countries are selected randomly to form a single trading bloc.

these countries have been chosen, the world is characterized as a group of n - 1 trading
units that are no longer of equal size. Optimal tariffs are calculated for these n - 1 trading
blocs, as described above, and the resulting level of world welfare is obtained. Welfare is
still calculated separately for each country within a bloc, maintaining the assumption that
countries are the same size.
The optimal tariffs for the customs union are arrived at by treating the two countries
as a single country with an endowment vector equal to the sum of the member country
endowments. The vector of common external tariffs is that which maximizes joint welfare.
The corresponding consumption levels of each of the goods are calculated for the entire bloc
and distributed across the member countries according to the relative wealth of each country
valued at the tariff distorted world prices. 13 It is possible that one of the countries will be
made worse off in the CU than it was standing alone. It can be shown, however, that the
country that gains can compensate the country that loses and still be made better off by the
agreement.

Kemp and Wan (1976) point out that a CU can always be Pareto improving if

the CU sets the appropriate external tariffs. It follows then that a CU that does not consider
the welfare of extra-union countries can enhance the welfare of each of its member countries
and hence that the "winners" can compensate the "losers" when imposing optimal tariffs.
The process of reducing the number of trading blocs then continues. That is, of the
n- 1 trading blocs, one of which is a bloc of two countries, two are randomly combined. The
result will be n- 2 trading units, and either there will be two trading units with two member
countries and n - 4 single countries, or one trading unit with three member countries and
n - 3 single countries. This process continues until there are no additional trading blocs to

be formed, i.e., all countries are included in a single trading bloc. This situation, free trade,
12 As will be seen, selection rules other than random customs union formation can be used.
13 The relative wealth of countries will differ in the tariff distorted equilibrium.

given countries of approx imately the same size, will result in the maxim um level of
world
welfare.
A single iteratio n of the above procedu re yields a path of world welfare that is
depend ent on both the pattern of endowm ents and the order in which countries are
chosen
to form custom s unions. In order to elimina te this dependency, the procedu re is carried
out
a large numbe r of times. For each iteratio n, a different distribu tion of the goods is generat
ed,
and the pattern of CU formati on is different. The results present ed will thus be the expecte
d
path of world welfare, conditio nal only on the numbe r of countri es and the number ofgood
s.

3. Result s: Welfar e Effects of Custom s Union Forma tion
Having developed the model theoret ically and comput ationall y, it is a straight forward
matter to modify it to address a number of issues. The questions discussed in this
section
are: (1) what, on average, are the costs or benefits in terms of world welfare of a
system
that reduces trade barriers through CU formation; (2) how much does it matter what
type
of world we live in, e.g., how does the distribu tion of each good across countries
matter;
(3) does it matter what types of countries form a CU; and (4) how might GATT- impose
d
restrict ions on the commo n externa l tariff alter the path of world welfare in a system
of CU
formati on?
The

re~ults

present ed in the following subsections are expecta tions in the statistic al

'

sense. The process described in Section 2, perform ed only once, will yield a particu lar
path
of world welfare depend ent on the order in which the countries were random ly selected
to
form custom s unions. For instanc e, the path of world welfare could be very differen
t if the
random process happen ed to pick the most similar countries than if it happen ed
to pick
the most different countries. The following results are thus averages over a large number
of
simulat ions. The results present ed here are based on 200 iteratio ns of the procedu re outlined
above.
The first subsect ion will analyze the base case of the effects of custom s union formation. The subsequ ent subsections will seek to decompose this result and to shed some
light
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on what might cause the actual experience to deviate from this benchmark case.

General Impact: A Benchmark Case
This section proceeds to calculate the expected path of world welfare with random
CU formation. It is difficult to predict what this may look like a priori. While the standard
gains from trade arguments suggest that the elimination of the barriers to trade between
countries is likely to be welfare enhancing, the imposition of an optimal common external
tariff accompanied by retaliation from non-member countries, and the general "beggar-thyneighbor" qualities of trading blocs cloud the issue. As discussed above, the results can
in essence be thought of as the extent to which trade creating forces overshadow the trade
diversionary tendencies of trading blocs.
Figure 1 presents the path of world welfare for the benchmark case of bilateralism.
The vertical axis measures the deviation from free trade welfare of a given configuration
of trading blocs, 14 •15 and the horizontal axis denotes the number of trading blocs. It is
presented in a high-low graph of the expected level of welfare at each configuration along
with the maximum and minimum levels of world welfare at the given configuration. The
dashed lines are, therefore, the outer envelope of welfare under dynamic customs union
formation. 16 The solid line in Figure 1 is the expected path of world welfare for a world
starting with ten countries and three goods that sequentially combine to form CUs until all
countries are members of a single CU, a situation of free trade.
From Figure 1, it is evident that a system of liberalization via CU formation is not
likely to be beneficial should the process stop short of free trade. World welfare is found to
14 Welfare is measured relative to free trade, which is
the situation that maximizes world welfare.
15 I have refrained from expressing the results
as a fraction of free trade world welfare as the appropriate choice
of parameters can yield any fractional deviation that is desired. This is a drawback to most models of this
type. Krugman (1991), for example, was able to achieve dramatically different results by varying the elasticity
of substitution in consumption.
16 It should be noted that what is depicted is not the same as the optimal path of welfare given a configuration
of endowments. The resulting low at a given stage may not lie along the same path as the low in the previous
stage. The minimum and maximum reported are specific to the number of trading blocks rather than to a
particular path of customs union development.
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Figure 1

Benchmark Path of World Welfare
10 Countries, 3 Goods, and 200 Iterations
(With high and low for each # of trading blocs.)
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decline at an increasing rate as the number of trading blocs declines. 17 The minimal level
of welfare is reached when there are only two large trading blocs, the stage just prior to free
trade. This is ~ot to say that all CUs are detrimental since what is reported is an average
across many random simulations. Instead, the decline in welfare is a result of the asymmetric
changes in welfare caused by the most beneficial and the most detrimental CUs. While the
welfare increasing arra:cgements lead to a very small increase in welfare, significant losses
are incurred by the formation of other unions. The result is that on average welfare declines
with CU formation.
Interestingly, the lower envelope for world welfare reaches a minimum when there are
three trading blocs. The computational structure of the model permits a detailed analysis
17 From left to right on the graph.

of this phenomenon . The results of such an analysis show that the minimum level of welfare
arises when the three blocs are configured as one large trade union, composed of eight of the
original countries, and two of the original countries are excluded from the union. Welfare
then increases when one of the countries is absorbed into the union. This is quite consistent
with fears expressed elsewhere that a tremendous drawback to regionalism is its capacity,
perhaps even tendency, to exclude small, perhaps less developed, countries.
It is important to note that an increase in world welfare does not necessarily represent
a pareto improvemen t. The customs unions that form are always beneficial (with transfers)
to the member countries, but possibly detrimental to the excluded countries. If world welfare
increases, it is likely to be because the gains accruing to the CU exceed the losses experienced
by the excluded blocs, rather than that everybody gains.
Figure 2 presents the average tariff rates correspondin g to the path of world welfare
in Figure 1. What is depicted is the average tariff paid on any good in any transaction
involving a positive tariff; thereby including interbloc trade in the calculation. As in Figure
4, the solid line represents the expected average tariff while the dashed lines represent the
outer envelope of the average tariffs observed in the 200 iterations.
Not surprisingly, there is an inverse relationship between average tariff levels and
world welfare. If the average tariff increases (decreases) with CU formation, world welfare
decreases (increases). The path of the average tariff rate is quite interesting. The change
in the number of blocs from ten to two results in roughly a tripling of average tariffs, from
25% to 75%. These simulated tariff levels are significantly greater than those actually ob- ·
served. There are many possible, not mutually exclusive, explanations for this observation.
Some examples are: first, there may be greater cooperation between countries, or blocs of
countries, than this model assumes; second, the relatively small number of countries taken
as the starting point may be a poor representatio n of the world; 18 and third, goods may be

closer substitutes than is assumed in this model, so that each country's market power and
18 Indeed, simulations with a larger number of countries do result in lower optimal tariffs in the initial stages;
stages with many trading blocs.
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hence optimal tariffs are lower. It is not unlikely that even in this model the average noncooperat ive tariff would be much lower if the number of countrie s more accurate ly reflected
the world configuration.
Two conclusions can be drawn from Figures 4 and 5. First, a system of CU formatio n
is likely to reduce world welfare until there exist two competi ng blocs of countries. Second,
CU formatio n could lead to significantly higher tariffs than are currently observed. As
discussed below, controlling this change in tariffs may prove to be the solution to the problem
posed by the increased tendency towards regionalism.

The Effects of Special ization
This section examine s the extent to which the degree of specializ ation affects the
dynamic time-pa th of world welfare under CU formatio n. Specializ ation in this framework

Figure 3
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is reflected by the variance of the distribution of goods across countries. A greater variance
in the distribution of goods implies a greater concentration of each good in a small number
of countries and is conceptually the same as increased specialization in production. Figure
3 presents the path of world welfare for three different assumptions regarding the degree of
specialization. The three lines each represent CU formation for different worlds, each with
goods distributed with a different variance across countries.
The benchmark case of the previous section is included in Figure 3 as the time-path
of world welfare for a world in which there is an intermediate degree of specialization. The
results for this case hold consistently across different assumptions regarding the degree of
specialization. Also from Figure 3, it is apparent that the loss associated with customs union
formation is an increasing function of the variance of the distribution of each good across
countries. This results from the greater disparity in the endowments between the existing
trading blocs at each stage. For example, suppose that there are only two blocs and the first
imports goods 1 through m1, while the second imports goods m1 +1 through m. Then, as the

variance of the distrib ution of goods increases, so does the fractio n
of each bloc's endowment
of its expor t goods as a fractio n of the world endow ment. As this
perce nt increases, so does
each bloc's ability to affect its terms of trade. 19 This implies that
each count ry will impose
larger tariffs. The larger the tariffs, the larger the devia tion from
the free trade outco me
and hence the larger the decline in world welfare associated with
the forma tion of any given
tradin g bloc.
The general conclusion to be drawn from Figur e 3 is that the efforts
to refocus trade
negot iation s away from bilate ral metho ds to multi latera l negot iation
s shoul d increase with
beliefs regard ing the distrib ution of resources world-wide; as the varian
ce of the distrib ution
increases, so do the detrim ental effects of custom s union forma tion.

Type s of CU Form ation
This section concerns itself with the exten t to which the relativ
e endowments of
countries forming CUs matte rs for world welfare. Riezm an (1985)
presen ts a discussion
of optim al customs union forma tion where enhan cing economic
welfare is the object ive of
each indivi dual country. A look at the patter n of existing prefer ential
tradin g arrang ement s
suggests that eleme nts relate d to· the physical proxim ity of countries
perha ps play a greate r
role than does the enhan cemen t of economic welfare alone. Given
this casua l observation,
this sectio n will analy ze CU formation along economic lines that
will provid e insights into
the effects of bilate ralism as it is observed.
The startin g point for this section will be the assertion that proxi mity
is a significant
indica tor of differences in countries. That is, the relativ e endow ments
of prima ry factors and
the stage of develo pmen t are highly correl ated with proximity. Once
this assertion is made,
it is reasonable to represe:Qt proximity, in this model, with the exten
t to which individual
countries differ in their patter n of endowments.
l9 One way of thinkin g about this is to make an analogy to the
4-firm concen tration ratio. As the concen tration
of sales within a small numbe r of firms increases, the anticom petitive
effects of a merger increas e. Similarly, as
the good becomes concen trated within a small numbe r of countri
es, the likelihood that a "merger" of "firms"
is more detrime ntal to world welfare increases.

The results presented correspond to the pa.th of world welfare under three different
rules of customs union formation. The first two rules for CU formation are based on a
comparison of the endowments of the countries; first, countries with the most similar endowments a.re selected to form a. CU a.t ea.ch stage and second, countries with the least similar
endowments are chosen to form a CU. The third selection mechanism is the benchmark case,
random CU formation.
Countries are judged to be similar or different based on the following index of relative
endowments (RE):

RE,k =

L

18•; - <S'k;l,

j

where
r

_

Uxy-

Py · f.xy

p
"m
i..J j=l j

· f.xj

'

is the fraction of the total wealth of country x derived from its endowment of good y. At
ea.ch stage, the two countries tha.t yield the lowest (highest) RE are determined to be the
most (least) similar. A country that is endowed with relatively more of a given good is said
to possess a comparative a.dva.nta.ge with respect to that good. This formula. will thus select
the two countries with the least and most divergent patterns of comparative a.dva.nta.ge.
Figure 4 presents the results for the three different scenarios. The graph is to be read
in the same way as was Figure 1, with the number of independent trading blocs decreasing
from left to right. The top line in Figure 4 is the pa.th of world welfare assuming that the least
similar countries form a. CU. 20 The center line represents random customs union formation.
The bottom line assumes customs union formation between the most similar countries. Ea.ch
of these scenarios is generated. holding the distribution of goods across countries constant.
The story told in Figure 4 is that if it is the most different countries that form customs
unions, customs union formation should be encouraged. In contrast to all other simulations
thus far, welfare increases in every stage. This result is fairly easily explained in terms of
20 Note that this differs from the preceding section in that this is for a given distribution of goods across countries
while the previous section allowed the distribution of goods across countries to vary while formin~~; random CUs.
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trad e cre atio n and diversion. Wh en
the mo st different cou ntri es elim ina te
the ir bar rier s to
trad e, the pot ent ial for trad e diversion
is gre atly red uce d. Tra de bet wee n the
"mo st efficient
pro duc er," the larg est exp orte r, and
the "lea st effi cien tpro duc er," the larg
est imp orte r, is
pro mo ted . Wh ile it is possible for trad
e diversion to occur, any dele teri ous effe
cts tha t result
are generally overwhelmed by the pos
itiv e trad e cre atio n effects.
At the opp osit e ext rem e, if the cou ntri
es wit h the mo st sim ilar end owm ent
s erec t
com mo n bar rier s to trad e, the effects
on world welfare are far worse tha n
ran dom customs
uni on formation. Thi s resu lts from the
dra mat ical ly incr eas ed abi lity of the
cus tom s union
to affect its term s of trad e, leading to
hig her tariffs and increasingly dis tort
ed trad e flows.
As blocs wit h very different endowm
ents app ear , the se sym met rica lly hig
her tariffs divert
con sum ptio n towards tha t good in
which the bloc is well endowed, gre
atly reducing the
vol um e of trad e. The red uce d volume
of trad e implies a lower level of world
welfare.
The resu lts of this section imp ly a
possible role for the GA TT in a sys
tem of hi-

19

. . ._

lateral trade arrangem ents. Tha.t is, if the GATT can devise a. method of encouraging
arrangem ents between countries with diverse patterns of compara tive a.dva.nta.ge, bilateral
21
agreeme nts would be more likely to promote rather than to reduce world welfare. In ad-

dition, it permits a. superficial analysis of the observed trading arrangem ents. Given tha.t
countrie s seem to enter into such arrangem ents based on geographical considerations, it
seems likely tha.t it is similar countries tha.t are entering into these arrangem ents, with the
exceptio n of Mexico. The Europea n Economic Commu nity ha.s also ha.d significant difficulties integrati ng the mediterr anean countries, which are less developed, tha.t is, which differ
significantly from the original member s. The results of this section suggest, therefore, tha.t
the observed arrangem ents are likely to be welfare reducing .

Commo n Externa l Tariff Formul ation
The final issue addresse d is the formulat ion of the common external tariff ( CET) for
a. given customs union. Article XXIV of the GATT states tha.t "barriers should not on the
whole be higher or more restrictiv e than in the constitu ent territorie s prior to formatio n of
such a. union." While there are many interpret ations of this requirem ent, some involving the
a.vera.ge of tariffs across goods and some tha.t apply a. common standard to ea.ch good, we
will focus here on the effects of a. standard applied to ea.ch good separate ly.
Suppose tha.t the above guidelines were taken to mean tha.t the CET for a.ny particular good must not exceed a. trade weighted a.vera.ge of the tariff levels in ea.ch of the
member countries prior to the agreement. Two issues regardin g the impositi on of such a.
requirem ent are examine d below. First, wha.t are the expected benefits of such a. restrictio n,
and second, are there other guidelines tha.t might further negate the deleterio us effects found
in the previou.:: sections. As will be discussed below, from a. pragmat ic point of view, the
non-com pliance of a. CU with a.ny particula r restrictio n must be considered.
21 It has been pointed out that this recommen dation could be interpreted as suggesting that the most beneficial
The fear was
customs unions could be between natural resource poor and natural resource rich countries.
could lead to
this
country,
developing
and
developed
a
between
were
union
this
subsequent ly expressed that if
point out that
a faster depletion of the developing countries natural resources than is desirable. I would like to
this recommen dation is only suggestive and, as with most rules, there are exceptions to it.

21
product ion in B and C, country A will now import from C. Thus the customs union
has
diverted imports to A away from the most efficient produce r and world welfare is reduced
.
Restrictions placed on the externa l tariff help to reduce the probabi lity that such diversio
n
occurs by reducing the likelihood that the common externa l tariff is greater than the
cost
difference between product ion in B and C.

In additio n to the reduction in trade diversion associated with higher externa l tariffs,
the non-me mber countries will not be induced to increase their barriers in retaliation.
As
a result, the trade creation resulting from the elimination of the interna l barriers to
trade
will likely outweigh the inevitable trade diverting effects and world welfare improves
with
customs union formation.
The above suggests that GATT restrictions would elimina te the detrime ntal effects
of CU formation. Inherent in the GATT, however, is a problem of enforcement. There
do
exist certain "memb er of the global community" incentives that lead countries to abide
by
the GATT guidelines. But in the event that the GATT guidelines impose large costs
on a
particu lar country, or group of countries, the GATT guidelines could be ignored. 23 As
has
already been discussed, the cost of wholesale non-compliance with the GATT guidelin
es is
potenti ally severe. Given this, there is interest in examining the potenti al loss associated
with
relaxing the above restriction. Relaxing the guidelines will, at the margin , induce greater
compliance with
the regulations. Of interest then is the cost, assuming full compliance, of
I
relaxing the rules regarding common externa l tariff formulation.
Suppose the GATT were to impose the somewhat looser restrict ion that the common
externa l tariff on imports of a particu lar good were not to exceed the maxim um tariff existing
in the constitu ent territories prior to the arrangement. What would be the cost in terms
of
world welfare, assuming both scenarios mean full compliance? From Figure 6, it is evident
that this would imply a very small reduction in world welfare, and would at the margin
result in a greater degree of compliance. Figure 6 further reports the path of world welfare
23 The common external tariffs of the EEC were never evaluated because it was not
certain what to do if they
were found to be unacceptable.
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Figure 5 presen ts the patter n of world welfare under two regimes. The top
line is the
path of world welfare when blocs are restric ted to imposi ng a CET no larger
than the trade
weighted average of the memb er countr y tariffs prior to the format ion of a
CU. The bottom
line is the path of world welfare under random custom s union format ion
and unrest ricted
comm on extern al tariff imposition; that is, the bench mark case.
The benefits of restric ting the comm on extern al tariff are obvious. Under
restric ted
CET formulation, world welfare is not significantly affected by custom s
union formation,
while under optima l tariffs, welfare declines significantly. 22 This differential
arises throug h
the elimin ation of the trade diverting effects of the increase in monopsony
power associated
with larger countries. Trade diversion may still occur due to the remov
al of barriers on
intra-u nion trade, but is largely elimin ated. For examp le, suppose countr ies
A and C form a
customs union. If a good was import ed into countr y A from countr y B prior
to the formation
of the custom s union, it must be that B is the more efficient produc er of
the good. If the
comm on extern al tariff of the [A, C] custom s union exceeds the cost differe
ntial between
22 While the sequenc e of CU formatio n is random, the sequenc e is the
same in both scenario s.

Figure 6
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under the stricter guideline that the CET not exceed the minimum of the pre-existing tariffs.
This is included primarily to illustrate that there is only a marginal payoff to imposing a
rather severe upper bound on the common external tariff. If one is sufficiently pessimistic
about the degree of compliance likely to accompany any GATT restriction, the small cost of
relaxing the restriction and the small benefits associated with a tighter restriction suggest
that perhaps the former is more prudent than the latter.
Figure 6 can also be used to loosely discuss the dynamic time-path of world welfare
under the assumption that regionalism takes the form of free trade areas (FTAs) rather
than customs unions. FTAs are similar to customs unions with the difference being that
each country maintains its own set of external tariffs. The·scenarios restricting the common
external tariffs to their minimum and maximum preexisting values can be thought of as

upper and lower bounds on the time path of world welfare with FTAs. If the countries
involved agree not to raise their respective trade barriers, we know that the aggregate rate
of protection will lie within these bounds. This is quite a striking result. It says that the
sequential formation of FTAs is, in fact, likely to raise world welfare, or at least not likely to
lower it. This suggests that free trade areas can indeed serve to complement the multilateral
process. If, in fact, FTAs do not reduce world welfare even in the absence of progress in
the multilateral arena, FTAs can be looked upon favorably as they have the potential effect
of reducing the number of players in any subsequent multilateral negotiations, or at least
reducing the number of margins on which multilateral negotiations are pushing.

5. Conclusions
This paper deals with an issue of increasing importance in a world where preferential
trading arrangements are the call of the day. The purpose is to provide some insight into
the potential costs or benefits associated with sequential customs union formation and to
provide some guidelines against which proposed customs unions might be judged.

The

principle finding of the analysis is that the dynamic time-path of world welfare is likely
to decline monotonically with sequential customs uni0 -1 formation. This decline stops, of
course, when the final two trading blocs form a trade union and we have global free trade,
in which case world welfare is maximized.
The assertion that free trade is the eventual outcome of bilateralism is, however, not
certain. More likely is the existence of a small number of large trading blocs. As we have
seen, this proposition suggests that sequential customs union formation, left unfettered, is
not likely to be beneficial from a global perspective, and will be particularly detrimental
should the unions be exclusionary, leaving some countries in the lurch.
The results presented here are generally consistent with the results presented by
Krugman. Absent from my results is the somewhat intriguing "pessimal" value of three blocs.
As mentioned above, the model presented here suggests that welfare declines monotonically

with a discontinuity between two blocs and a single bloc. The results differ substantially
from Deardorff and Stern, who suggest that successive customs union formation results in
monotonical ly increasing world welfare. As discussed in the introduction , the inclusion of
only prohibitive tariffs in their analysis is the source of this difference. Where the results
presented here diverge from the other studies is in the scope of issues the model will address.
More precisely, this model is capable of analyzing a wider variety of tariff setting rules than
are either of the other models. In addition, the welfare effects of different patterns of customs
union formation have been discussed.
It has been shown that the extent to which PTAs should be thought of as an undesir-

able phenomenon is related very closely to the extent to which countries differ. If one believes
that resources and technology differ dramatically across countries and that the GATT lacks
any influence regarding which customs unions are formed, then efforts should be made to
shift the emphasis of trade negotiations back to the multilateral arena. It would be useful if
further research on this issue were forthcoming.
The results further reveal that arrangement s between individual countries that differ
significantly, given a world distribution of goods, should be encouraged while those between
similar countries should be discouraged. A customs union such as that between the United
States and Canada, for instance, is more likely to reduce world welfare than is an agreement
'

between the U~ted States and Mexico. That is not to say that the U.S.-Canad a agreement
will not enhance the welfare of both countries; in fact, both countries benefit from the formation of a customs union if the appropriate tariffs are set. The reasoning underlying the
reduction in world welfare is that a U.S.-Canada customs union possesses a greater ability
to increase its terms of trade than does a U.S.-Mexico arrangement . This is a rather discouraging result. Given the close physical proximity of the countries currently participating
in preferential trading arrangement s the world is likely made worse off by the current set
of agreements. This conclusion does, however, rest on the assumption that geographical
proximity is a reasonable proxy for comparative advantage.

25
On a more pragmatic level, it has been shown that the guidelines imposed by GATT
could be extremely effective in reducing the costs associated with customs union formation.
It has even been shown that these restraints need not be extremely strict to prevent the
significant losses in terms of world welfare. A restriction as seemingly innocuous as the
maximum of the pre-existing tariffs will largely eliminate the deleterious effects of customs
union formation. In addition to the reduction in trade diversion associated with higher
external tariffs, the non-membe r countries will not be induced to increase their barriers in
retaliation. As a result, the trade creation resulting from the elimination of the internal
barriers to trade will likely outweigh the inevitable trade diverting effects and world welfare
will improve with customs union formation.
Whiie this paper has shed light on certain aspects of PTAs, there are a number of
_:es that have not been addressed. One is the apparent regional aspect of PTAs. This
suggests that the endogenization of the customs union partner choice should be investigated
further. In addition, it would be useful to explore different tariff setting rules; tariff setting
policies that are not intended to reap monopsony benefits, but are instead more consistent
with perhaps a conservative social welfare approach, or the protection of particular industries
for non-economic objectives. Some mention was made in the text regarding the likely effects
of free trade areas. The results presented were merely suggestive. Given the preponderan ce
of free trade areas, the differential effects of customs unions and free trade areas should be
examined in greater detail.
A final issue is the extent to which gains in the multilateral arena might offset the
losses due to customs union formation. One way of looking at this issue, in the context of
this model, is to assume that world tariffs are a declining fraction of the optimal tariffs. For
instance, the move from ten blocs to nine involves imposing tariffs that are only 95% of the
optimal level and the move from nine to eight blocs involves the imposition of tariffs that
are 90% of the optimal level. The declining fraction would be a proxy for success in the
multilateral arena concurrent with customs union formation.

Of further interest is the similarity between these results and that of the horizontal
merger literature. When two countries that export the same product, i.e., the most similar
countries, form a customs union, the "merger" increases their market power and reduces
general welfare. A further investigation of this analogy and the incorporation of the insights
provided by this literature could prove to be informative.
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